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Abstract
In the paper, cooperative two-stage network games are studied. On the ﬁrst stage of the game players form a network, while on the
second stage players choose their behaviors according to the network realized on the ﬁrst stage. As a cooperative solution concept
in the game the core is considered. It is proved that some imputations are time-inconsistent, whereas one can design time-consistent
imputation distribution procedure for them. Moreover, strong time-consistency is also considered.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ITQM 2014.
Keywords: network; cooperation; characteristic function; imputation; core; τ-value; imputation distribution procedure; strong time-consistency
1. Introduction
In the present paper we analyze how mutual links connecting players can impact on players’ behavior. Such links
deﬁne a network. We consider a two-stage game in which players form a network on the ﬁrst stage, and on the second
stage players choose their controls. Such a network game is considered in a strategic setting, and following7 a strategy
of a player is a rule that uniquely deﬁnes his behavior on both stages of the game (player’s behavior on the second
stage depends on the network formed on the ﬁrst stage).
We suppose that payoﬀ of each player depends on his behavior on the second stage and behavior of his ”neighbors”
in a network formed on the ﬁrst stage of the game.
Similar setting, modeled with a two-stage network game, was considered in3,5. In the mentioned papers authors
consider the model in which on the ﬁrst stage players form a network, and on the second stage players are involved in
a 2 × 2 coordination game which is the same for all players.
Our model is based on papers studying mechanisms of network formation, its evolution during the game as well as
papers studying allocation rules and its properties for a ﬁxed network1,2,3. Thus, in1 the Nash network is considered
as a solution in the strategic setting, and the network evolution is modeled as a convergent stochastic process. In11
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the network evolution is constructed as the result of players’ actions, and the solution is considered in the sense of
subgame perfectness. In2,6 solution concepts in network games are studied regardless of the network formation.
In the mentioned above papers the problem of time-consistency was not studied. The time-inconsistency problem
was initiated in8 for cooperative diﬀerential games, and later in10 a special mechanism of stage payments—imputation
distribution procedure—was designed to overcome time-inconsistency of cooperative solution concepts. It was also
shown that the time-inconsistency problem arises not only in cooperative diﬀerential games but in other classes of
cooperative dynamic games. In12 it was shown that such problem arises in cooperative two-stage network games, in
particular, is was proved that the Shapley value is time-inconsistent. In the present paper we show that other cooper-
ative solutions—the core, the τ-value—are time-inconsistent. We also investigate more strict property of cooperative
solution concepts—the strong time-consistency property.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the formalization of a two-stage network game is given. In Sec-
tion 3 the cooperative model is considered assuming that players jointly choose behaviors on both stages to maximize
the sum of their payoﬀs. Here we additionally consider the case of choosing behaviors jointly only on the second
stage, provided the network on the ﬁrst stage is ﬁxed. Questions of time-consistency and strong time-consistency of
cooperative solution concepts are investigated in Section 4. In Section 5 we consider a numerical example, and this
section concludes the paper.
2. The Model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a ﬁnite set of players who can interact with each other. Such interaction between two
players means the existence of link connecting them and, therefore, communication between them. On the contrary,
the absence of link connecting players means the absence of any communication between the players. Under these
assumptions cooperation of players is said to be restricted by communication structure (or a network). Therefore, in
such model we can use a technique of network games, in which the primary element is the network. A pair (N, g) we
call a network. Here N is a set of its nodes (and it coincides with the set of players), and g ∈ N × N is a ﬁnite set
of links. If an element (i, j) ∈ g, it means that there is a link connecting players i and j, and, therefore, generating
communication of the players in the network. Below to simplify our notations, we will identify the network with its
set of links denoting as g, and a link (i, j) in the network we will denote as a pair i j. In our setting we suppose that all
links are indirect, so i j = ji.
Consider a two-stage problem. On the ﬁrst stage each player chooses his partners—other players with whom he
wants to form links. After choosing partners and establishing links, players, thereby, form a network. On the second
stage having the network formed, each player chooses a control inﬂuencing his payoﬀ. Consider the problem in
details.
2.1. First Stage: Network Formation
Having the player set N given, deﬁne the link formation rule in the standard way: links, and, therefore, a network,
are formed as a result of players’ simultaneous choices.
Let Mi ⊆ N \ {i} be the set of players whom player i ∈ N can oﬀer a mutual link, and ai ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} be the
maximal number of links which player i can maintain (and, therefore, can oﬀer).
Behavior of player i ∈ N on the ﬁrst stage is an n-dimensional proﬁle gi = (gi1, . . . , gin) which components are
deﬁned as:
gi j =
{
1, if player i oﬀers a link to j ∈ Mi,
0, otherwise, (1)
subject to the constrain:∑
j∈N
gi j  ai. (2)
The condition gii = 0, i ∈ N excludes loops from the network, whereas the condition (2) shows that the number of
possible links is limited. If Mi = N \ {i}, player i can oﬀer a link to any player, whereas if ai = n − 1, he can maintain
any number of links.
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A set of all possible behaviors of player i ∈ N on the ﬁrst stage satisfying (1)–(2), denote by Gi. The Cartesian
product
∏
i∈N Gi is the set of behavior proﬁles on the ﬁrst stage. We suppose that players choose their behaviors on
the ﬁrst stage simultaneously and independently from each other. In particular, player i ∈ N chooses gi ∈ Gi, and as a
result the behavior proﬁle (g1, . . . , gn) is formed.
Under our assumptions having the behavior proﬁle (g1, . . . , gn) formed, an undirect link i j = ji is established in
network g if and only if gi j = g ji = 1, i.e. g consists of mutual links which were oﬀered only by both players.
Consider a simple example.
Example 2.1. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and players choose the following behaviors on the ﬁrst stage: g1 = (0, 1, 1, 1),
g2 = (1, 0, 1, 0), g3 = (1, 1, 0, 0), g4 = (0, 0, 1, 0). The resulting network g contains three links {12, 13, 23}.
2.2. Second Stage: Choosing Control
Having formed the network, players choose their behaviors on the second stage. Deﬁne neighbors of player i in
network g as elements from the set Ni(g) = { j ∈ N \ {i} : i j ∈ g}. Assuming that network g may be not proﬁtable for
players, allow them to break formed links.
Deﬁne components of an n-dimensional proﬁle di(g) as follows:
di j(g) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, if player i does not break the link formed on the ﬁrst stage
with player j ∈ Ni(g) in network g,
0, otherwise.
(3)
Elements di(g), satisfying (3), denote by Di(g), i ∈ N. It is obvious that proﬁle (d1(g), . . . , dn(g)) aﬀects network g
formed on the ﬁrst stage by removing some links: proﬁle (d1(g), . . . , dn(g)) applied to network g changes its structure
and forms a new network, denoted by gd. Network gd is obtained from g by removing links i j such that either
di j(g) = 0 or d ji(g) = 0.
Moreover, on the second stage player i ∈ N chooses control ui from a ﬁnite set Ui. Then, behavior of player i ∈ N
on the second stage is a pair (di(g), ui): it deﬁnes, on the one hand, links to be removed di(g), and, on the other hand,
control ui.
Both new network gd and controls ui, i ∈ N, deﬁne a payoﬀ function Ki of player i, which, according to the game
rules, depends on player’s behavior on the second stage as well as behavior of his neighbors in network gd. More
formally, Ki(ui, uNi(gd)), i ∈ N, is non-negative real-valued function deﬁned on the set Ui ×
∏
j∈Ni(gd) Uj. Here uNi(gd)
denotes chosen controls u j of all player i’s neighbors j ∈ Ni(gd) in network gd. Assume that functions Ki, i ∈ N,
satisfy the following property:
(P): for any two networks g and g′ and player i if |Ni(g)|  |Ni(g′)|, the inequality Ki(ui, uNi(g))  Ki(ui, uNi(g′)) holds
for all (ui, uNi(g)) ∈ Ui ×
∏
j∈Ni(g) Uj and (ui, uNi(g′)) ∈ Ui ×
∏
j∈Ni(g′) Uj.
Let network g be realized on the ﬁrst stage. Consider two behaviors of player i ∈ N on the second stage: (di(g), ui)
and (d′i (g), ui). Here d
′
i (g) diﬀers from di(g) in that player i removed more links from network g using d
′
i (g) than
using di(g), constituting a proﬁle (d1(g), . . . , dn(g)). Denote a network, formed from network g, by proﬁle d′(g) =
(d1(g), . . . , di−1(g), d′i (g), di+1(g), . . . , dn(g)), as g
d′ . This means that |Ni(gd)|  |Ni(gd′ )|, and player i’s payoﬀ decreases
as the total number of links decreases. Therefore, his behavior on the second stage (d′i (g), ui) is dominated by behavior
(di(g), ui).
3. Cooperation in Two-Stage Network Games
The remaining part of paper will be devoted to study the cooperative case in which we answer three main questions:
what is a cooperative solution in the game? Can it be realized in the game? Is it strongly time-consistent? To answer
all these questions, ﬁrst we consider and analyze an additional case which results can be used.
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3.1. Two-Stage Network Game: Cooperation on the Second Stage
In this section we suppose that players’ behavior proﬁle (g1, . . . , gn), gi ∈ Gi, i ∈ N, which is chosen on the ﬁrst
stage, is ﬁxed, and it forms network g. On the second stage players jointly choose n pairs (d∗i (g), u
∗
i ) ∈ Di(g) × Ui,
i ∈ N maximizing the sum of players’ payoﬀ.
Following12, we obtain the result.
Proposition 3.1. The maximal sum of players’ payoﬀ can be calculated by the formula:∑
i∈N
Ki(u∗i , u
∗
Ni(g)) = max(di(g),ui),i∈N
∑
i∈N
Ki(ui, uNi(gd)) = maxui∈Ui,i∈N
∑
i∈N
Ki(ui, uNi(g)). (4)
Proof. Choosing pairs (di(g), ui) ∈ Di(g) × Ui, i ∈ N, players maximize the sum ∑i∈N Ki(ui, uNi(gd)). Since payoﬀ
functions Ki, i ∈ N, satisfy the property (P), the removal of any link i j ∈ g decreases payoﬀ of N, and, therefore,
components of proﬁles d∗i (g), i : Ni(g)  ∅ consist of ones, and they do not change network g on the second stage as
well as the set of players’ neighbors (Ni(gd) = Ni(g)). Thus, we have
max
(di(g),ui),i∈N
∑
i∈N
Ki(ui, uNi(gd)) = maxui∈Ui,i∈N
∑
i∈N
Ki(ui, uNi(g)),
that proves (4).
Next problem is to allocate the maximal sum of players’ payoﬀs among the players. After the allocating procedure,
the game ends.
To allocate the maximal sum of players’ payoﬀs we construct an auxiliary cooperative TU-game (N, v(g)). The
characteristic function v(g) in this game is deﬁned for any subset S ⊆ N—a coalition—as follows:
v(g,N) =
∑
i∈N
Ki(u∗i , u
∗
Ni(g)),
v(g, S ) = max
ui∈Ui,i∈S
∑
i∈S
Ki(ui, uNi(g)∩S ),
v(g,∅) = 0,
subject to network g is ﬁxed.
In general, v(g, S ) is deﬁned in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern as the maximal payoﬀ that coalition S
can guarantee itself (the maxmin value) in a zero-sum game between two players: coalition S , maximizing its payoﬀ,
and its complement N \ S , minimizing its payoﬀ, provided that network g is ﬁxed.
Proposition 3.2. If payoﬀ functions Ki, i ∈ N, are non-negative and satisfy the property (P), the maximal payoﬀ that
coalition S can guarantee itself is calculated by formula:
v(g, S ) = max
ui∈Ui,i∈S
∑
i∈S
Ki(ui, uNi(g)∩S ). (5)
Proof. The maxmin value for coalition S ⊂ N is deﬁned as:
max
(di(g),ui),i∈S
min
(di(g),ui),i∈N\S
∑
i∈S
Ki(ui, uNi(gd)).
Here, obviously, the maximum operation is taken over behavior of players from coalition S , and the minimum opera-
tion is taken over behavior of players from its complement N \ S . Since the presence of link i j ∈ g, i ∈ S , j ∈ N \ S ,
increases payoﬀ of coalition S according to the property (P), rather than its absence, therefore, player j ∈ N \ S , as a
neighbor of i, changes his component in d j(g) from 1 to 0, i.e. removes link i j to minimize the payoﬀ of coalition S .
Thus, to minimize the value
∑
i∈S Ki(ui, uNi(gd)) players from N \ S remove all links with players from S . In this case
player i’s neighbors, i ∈ S , are players from the set Ni(gd) ∩ S , and his payoﬀ does not depend on u j, j ∈ N \ S , since
any link i j ∈ g, i ∈ S , j ∈ N \ S is removed. Therefore,
max
(di(g),ui),i∈S
min
(di(g),ui),i∈N\S
∑
i∈S
Ki(ui, uNi(gd)) = max(di(g),ui),i∈S
∑
i∈S
Ki(ui, uNi(gd)∩S ).
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Moreover, the removal of link i j ∈ g, i, j ∈ S reduces the payoﬀ of coalition S , thus, to maximize the value∑
i∈S Ki(ui, uNi(gd)∩S ), links between players from S are not changed, and also player i’s neighbors are become players
from the set Ni(g) ∩ S . Then we obtain
max
(di(g),ui),i∈S
∑
i∈S
Ki(ui, uNi(gd)∩S ) = maxui∈Ui,i∈S
∑
i∈S
Ki(ui, uNi(g)∩S ).
This proves the statement.
Note that under our assumptions values v(g, S ), S ⊂ N, can be calculated as a solution of a maximization problem
which is simpler than solving the maxmin problem in general case.
For a singleton {i}, its value is deﬁned in the following way:
v(g, {i}) = max
ui∈Ui
Ki(ui, uNi(g)∩{i}) = maxui∈Ui
Ki(ui),
and it does not depend on the network.
An imputation is an n-dimensional proﬁle ξ(g) = (ξ1(g), . . . , ξn(g)), satisfying both the eﬃciency condition and the
individual rationality condition:∑
i∈N
ξi(g) = v(g,N),
ξi(g)  v(g, {i}), i ∈ N.
The set of all imputations in the game (N, v(g)) we denote by I(v(g)).
A cooperative solution concept in the auxiliary cooperative TU-game (N, v(g)) with ﬁxed network g is a rule that
uniquely assigns a subset CSC(v(g)) ⊆ I(v(g)) to the game (N, v(g)). For example, if the cooperative solution concept
is the core C(v(g)), then
CSC(v(g)) = C(v(g)) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ξ(g) = (ξ1(g), . . . , ξn(g)) :
∑
i∈S
ξi(g)  v(g, S ), S ⊆ N
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ .
3.2. Two Stage Network Game: Cooperation on Both Stages
Suppose now that players jointly choose their behaviors on both stages of the game. Acting as one player and
choosing gi ∈ Gi, ui ∈ Ui, i ∈ N, the grand coalition, N, maximizes the value:∑
i∈N
Ki(ui, uNi(g)). (6)
Let the maximum be attained when players’ behavior proﬁles g∗i , u
∗
i , i ∈ N are chosen, and proﬁle (g∗1, . . . , g∗n) forms
network g∗. Here as well as in (4) to maximize the sum of players’ payoﬀs from N, players should not remove links
from the network, therefore, all components of proﬁles di(g), i : Ni(g)  ∅ are equal to 1 for any network g. Let∑
i∈N
Ki(u∗i , u
∗
Ni(g∗)) = maxgi∈Gi,i∈N
max
ui∈Ui,i∈N
∑
i∈N
Ki(ui, uNi(g)).
Again to allocate the maximal sum of players’ payoﬀs according to some imputation, we construct an auxiliary
cooperative TU-game (N,V). The characteristic function V is deﬁned in a way similar to one considered in Subsec-
tion 3.1.
The proposition below directly follows from Propositions 3.1–3.2.
Proposition 3.3. In the cooperative two-stage network game the superadditive characteristic function V(·) in the
sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern is deﬁned as:
V(N) =
∑
i∈N
Ki(u∗i , u
∗
Ni(g∗)),
V(S ) = max
gi∈Gi,i∈S
max
ui∈Ui,i∈S
∑
i∈S
Ki(ui, uNi(g)∩S ),
V(∅) = 0.
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For a singleton {i}, its value is deﬁned in the following way:
V({i}) = max
gi∈Gi
max
ui∈Ui
Ki(ui, uNi(g)∩{i}) = maxgi∈Gi
max
ui∈Ui
Ki(ui) = max
ui∈Ui
Ki(ui).
An imputation in the cooperative two-stage network game is an n-dimensional proﬁle ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn), satisfying∑
i∈N ξi = V(N) and ξi  V({i}) for all i ∈ N. The set of all imputations in the game (N,V) we denote by I(V).
A cooperative solution concept in the auxiliary cooperative TU-game (N,V) is a rule that uniquely assigns a subset
CSC(V) ⊆ I(V) to the game (N,V). For example, if the cooperative solution concept is the core C(V), then
CSC(V) = C(V) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) :
∑
i∈S
ξi  V(S ), S ⊆ N
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ .
4. Time-Consistent and Strongly Time-Consistent Cooperative Solutions
Suppose that at the beginning of the game players jointly decide to choose behavior proﬁles g∗i , u
∗
i , i ∈ N to
maximize the sum (6), and then allocate it according to a speciﬁed cooperative solution concept CSC(V) which
realizes an imputation ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn). It means that in the cooperative two-stage network game player i ∈ N should
receive the amount of ξi as his payoﬀ. What will happen if after the ﬁrst stage (after choosing the proﬁles g∗1, . . . , g
∗
n)
players recalculate the imputation according to the same cooperative solution concept? The behavior proﬁle g∗1, . . . , g
∗
n
on the ﬁrst stage forms network g∗, therefore, after recalculation of the imputation (according to the same cooperative
solution concept as ξ), players’ payoﬀs will be ξi(g∗), i ∈ N based on values of characteristic function v(g∗, S ) for all
S ⊆ N.
Deﬁnition 4.1. An imputation ξ ∈ CSC(V) is said to be time-consistent if there exists an imputation ξ(g∗) ∈
CSC(v(g∗)) such that the following equality holds for all players:
ξi = ξi(g∗), i ∈ N. (7)
A cooperative solution concept CSC(V) is time consistent if any imputation ξ ∈ CSC(V) is time-consistent.
The equality (7) means that if we choose a cooperative solution concept CSC(V) on the ﬁrst stage and according
to it calculate an imputation ξ, deﬁning players’ payoﬀs, and then on the second stage recalculate players’ payoﬀs
according to the same cooperative solution concept CSC(v(g∗)), i.e. calculate a new imputation ξ(g∗), subject to
formed network g∗, players’ payoﬀs will not change. Since in most games the condition (7) is not satisﬁed, the time-
consistency problem arises: player i ∈ N, who initially expected his payoﬀ to be equal to ξi, can receive diﬀerent
payoﬀ ξi(g∗). To avoid such situation in the game, we propose a stage payments mechanism—imputation distribution
procedure10 for ξ.
Deﬁnition 4.2. Imputation distribution procedure for ξ in the cooperative two-stage network game is a matrix
β =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
β11 β12
...
...
βn1 βn2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
where
ξi = βi1 + βi2, i ∈ N.
The value βik is a payment to player i on stage k = 1, 2. Therefore, the following payment scheme is applied: player
i ∈ N on the ﬁrst stage of the game receives the payment βi1, on the second stage of the game he receives the payment
βi2 in order to his total payment received on both stages βi1 + βi2 would be equal to the component of allocation ξi,
which he initially wanted to get in the game as the payoﬀ.
Deﬁnition 4.3. Imputation distribution procedure β for ξ is time-consistent if
ξi − βi1 = ξi(g∗), for all i ∈ N.
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It is obvious that time-consistent imputation distribution procedure for ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn) in the cooperative two-stage
network game can be deﬁned as follows:
βi1 = ξi − ξi(g∗), (8)
βi2 = ξi(g∗), i ∈ N.
In case of the cooperative solution conceptCSC(V) assigns multiple allocations (for example, the core), more strict
property of imputation distribution procedure can be used—the strong time-consistency property.
Deﬁnition 4.4. An imputation ξ ∈ CSC(V) is said to be strongly time-consistent if the following inclusion is satisﬁed:
CSC(v(g∗)) ⊆ CSC(V). (9)
A cooperative solution concept CSC(V) is strongly time-consistent if any imputation ξ ∈ CSC(V) is strongly time-
consistent.
Therefore, the coreC(V) is strongly time-consistent ifC(v(g∗)) ⊆ C(V). Unfortunately, for strongly time-consistent
imputation distribution procedures it is impossible even to derive formulas similar to (8).
Deﬁnition 4.5. Imputation distribution procedure β for ξ is strongly time-consistent if
(β11, . . . , βn1) ⊕CSC(v(g∗)) ⊆ CSC(V), (10)
where a ⊕ A = {a + a′ : a′ ∈ A, a ∈ Rn, A ⊂ Rn}.
Note, that strongly time-consistent imputation distribution procedure β for an imputation from the core C(V) satis-
ﬁes the inclusion:
(β11, . . . , βn1) ⊕C(v(g∗)) ⊆ C(V). (11)
5. Numerical Example
As an illustration consider a three-person game with some restrictions on players’ behaviors: each player can
maintain only one link; Player 3 can oﬀer a link only to Player 1. Under these restrictions we have: the set of players
N = {1, 2, 3}; subsets of players to whom each player can oﬀer a link are M1 = {2, 3},M2 = {1, 3},M3 = {1}; a number
of links each players can maintain: a1 = a2 = a3 = 1. Therefore, on the ﬁrst stage sets of players’ behaviors are:
G1 = {(0, 0, 0); (0, 1, 0); (0, 0, 1)}, G2 = {(0, 0, 0); (1, 0, 0); (0, 0, 1)}, G3 = {(0, 0, 0); (1, 0, 0)}, and only three networks
can be formed on the ﬁrst stage of the game: the empty network (the network without links, g = ∅), g = {12}, and
g = {13}.
Suppose that sets of controls Ui on the second stage for any network g, realized on the ﬁrst stage, are the same
U1 = U2 = U3 = {A, B}, and payoﬀ functions are deﬁned as:
Ki(ui) : Ki(A) = 1, Ki(B) = 0, i = 1, 2, 3,
K1(u1, u2) : K1(A, A) = 2, K1(A, B) = 4, K1(B, A) = 1, K1(B, B) = 3,
K1(u1, u3) : K1(A, A) = 3, K1(A, B) = 5, K1(B, A) = 1, K1(B, B) = 3,
K2(u2, u1) : K2(A, A) = 2, K2(A, B) = 4, K2(B, A) = 1, K2(B, B) = 3,
K3(u3, u1) : K3(A, A) = 2, K3(A, B) = 5, K3(B, A) = 1, K3(B, B) = 4.
Consider the case of cooperation on both stages. In this case the maximal value∑
i∈N
Ki(u∗i , u
∗
Ni(g∗)) = 8,
and it can be reached if players choose the following behaviors:
g∗1 = (0, 0, 1), g
∗
2 = (0, 0, 0), g
∗
3 = (1, 0, 0),
u∗1 = B, u
∗
2 = A, u
∗
3 = B.
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Note that behavior proﬁle g∗1, g
∗
2, g
∗
3 on the ﬁrst stage forms the network g
∗ = {13}.
Using Proposition 3.3, calculate values of characteristic function V(S ) for all coalitions S ⊆ N: V(N) = 8,
V({1, 2}) = 6, V({1, 3}) = 7, V({2, 3}) = 2, V({1}) = V({2}) = V({3}) = 1.
Suppose that the cooperative solution concept is the core: CSC(V) = C(V), the coreC(V) consists of 3-dimensional
vectors (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3) satisfying ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3 = 8, ξ1 + ξ2  6, ξ1 + ξ3  7, ξ2 + ξ3  2, ξ1  1, ξ2  1, ξ3  1, or,
equivalently:
ξ1 + ξ3 = 7,
ξ1  5,
ξ3  1,
ξ2 = 1.
The core C(V), plotted in barycentric coordinates, is shown in Fig. 1 (a).
Consider now cooperation on the second stage of the game, provided that network g∗ = {13} on the ﬁrst stage is
ﬁxed. Using Propositions 3.1–3.2, we calculate values of characteristic function v(g∗, S ) for all coalitions S ⊆ N:
v({13},N) = 8, v({13}, {1, 2}) = v({13}, {2, 3}) = 2, v({13}, {1, 3}) = 7, v({13}, {1}) = v({13}, {2}) = v({13}, {3}) = 1. If
we suppose that the cooperative solution concept is the coreCSC(v({13})) = C(v({13})), the coreC(v({13})) consists of
3-dimensional vectors (ξ1({13}), ξ2({13}), ξ3({13})) satisfying ξ1({13})+ξ2({13})+ξ3({12}) = 8, ξ1({13})+ξ2({13})  2,
ξ1({13}) + ξ3({13})  7, ξ2({13}) + ξ3({13})  2, ξ1({13})  1, ξ2({13})  1, ξ3({13})  1. These inequalities can be
simpliﬁed as:
ξ1({13}) + ξ3({13}) = 7,
ξ1({13})  1,
ξ3({13})  1,
ξ2({13}) = 1.
The core C(v({13})), plotted in barycentric coordinates, is shown in Fig. 1 (b).
Fig. 1. (a) the imputation set I(V) and the core C(V); (b) the imputation set I(v({13})) and the core C(v({13})).
Since C(V) ⊂ C(v(g∗)), the core C(V) is time-consistent cooperative solution concept in two-stage network games
but it is obvious that the core C(V) is not strongly time-consistent (inclusion (9) does not hold).
Consider another cooperative solution concept—the τ-value13. In the cooperative two-stage network game the
τ-value τ = (τ1, . . . , τn) is calculated as follows:
τ = m(V) + αV (M(V) − m(V)) , (12)
where M(V) = (M1(V), . . . ,Mn(V)), m(V) = (m1(V), . . . ,mn(V)) such that:
Mi(V) = V(N) − V(N \ {i}),
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mi(V) = max
S
i
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝V(S ) −
∑
j∈S \{i}
Mj(V)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
αV =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, M(V) = m(V),(∑
i∈N
Mi(V) − ∑
i∈N
mi(V)
)−1 (
V(N) − ∑
i∈N
mi(V)
)
, otherwise.
Using (12), we obtain: τ = (5 12 , 1, 1
1
2 ).
In the similar way one can calculate the τ-value τ(g∗) = (τ1(g∗), . . . , τn(g∗)) if network g∗ is formed on the ﬁrst
stage of the game:
τ(g∗) = m(v(g∗)) + αv(g∗) (M(v(g∗)) − m(v(g∗))) , (13)
where M(v(g∗)) = (M1(v(g∗)), . . . ,Mn(v(g∗))), m(v(g∗)) = (m1(v(g∗)), . . . ,mn(v(g∗))) such that:
Mi(v(g∗)) = v(g∗,N) − v(g∗,N \ {i}),
mi(v(g∗)) = max
S
i
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝v(g∗, S ) −
∑
j∈S \{i}
Mj(v(g∗))
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
αv(g∗) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0, M(v(g∗)) = m(v(g∗)),(∑
i∈N
Mi(v(g∗)) − ∑
i∈N
mi(v(g∗))
)−1 (
v(g∗,N) − ∑
i∈N
mi(v(g∗))
)
, otherwise.
Using (13), we obtain: τ(g∗) = (3 12 , 1, 3
1
2 ).
Note that the τ-value is time-inconsistent since there exists a player i ∈ N that τi  τi(g∗), and it contradicts (7).
Nevertheless, one can ﬁnd time-consistent imputation distribution procedure β for the τ-value (which will also be
strongly time-consistent since the τ-value is the single-valued cooperative solution concept).
Now construct time-consistent imputation distribution procedure for the τ-value τ. Having formed network g∗ on
the ﬁrst stage, players can recalculate the τ-value—τ(g∗). Time-consistent imputation distribution procedure for the
τ-value has the form:
β12 = τ1(g∗) = 312 , β11 = τ1 − τ1(g∗) = 2,
β22 = τ2(g∗) = 1, β21 = τ2 − τ2(g∗) = 0,
β32 = τ3(g∗) = 312 , β31 = τ3 − τ3(g∗) = −2,
or in the matrix form:
β =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
2 312
0 1
−2 312
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
According to β, players who initially wanted to receive payoﬀs as τ = (5 12 , 1, 1
1
2 ), get these payoﬀs in two stages: on
the ﬁrst stage they receive β11 = 2, β21 = 0, β31 = −2, whereas on the second stage they receive the remaining payoﬀs
β12 = 312 , β22 = 1, β32 = 3
1
2 (payments to players on the second stage is the imputation τ(g
∗)).
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